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In most multi-species fisheries managed through output controls, total allowable catches 
(TACs) are set primarily on the basis of biological considerations, usually on a species by 
species basis. An implicit assumption of management is that fishers are able to adjust their 
product mix in line with these quotas. If this is not the case, then over-quota catch occurs, 
leading to either illegal landings or discards. In either case, the effectiveness of the TAC in 
conserving the resource is reduced. In this paper we show that in the case of multi-species 
fisheries that exhibit jointness in production, setting TACs on an individual species’ basis is 
inappropriate. In particular, we quantify technical interactions through the estimation of a 
multi-output distance function for the UK North Sea beam and otter trawl fisheries, and find 
that in most cases, the potential of substitutability between the main and alternative species is 
relatively small. We argue that failure to quantify and integrate these technical interactions in 
the construction of management instruments for fisheries regulation, may result in increased 
discarding, illegal fishing and potentially lower than expected future yields.  
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The need for fisheries management has been accepted in most countries around the world, and 
relatively few completely unregulated fisheries exist within territorial waters of coastal states. 
Fisheries regulation varies considerably, ranging from basic limited entry to complex 
individual transferable quota programs. The failure of input controls to effectively regulate 
fishing activity as a consequence of input substitution (i.e. of unregulated inputs for restricted 
inputs) has resulted in many countries either fully adopting an output control system (e.g. 
New Zealand), or some combination of input and output controls. 
 
Fundamental to the use of output controls is the establishment of a total allowable catch 
(TAC). This may be either fished competitively – a strategy often criticized by economists 
due to the incentive to race to fish and the consequent dissipation of resource rent – or 
allocated to fishers as individual quotas (transferable or non-transferable). While in theory 
TACs are set on the basis of the multiple objectives of fisheries management, in practice 
TACs are primarily set on the basis of biological considerations, namely the state of the fish 
stocks. In Europe, advice on TACs is provided by the International Council for the 
Exploitation of the Seas (ICES) based on stock assessments of the individual species. 
Although some recognition is given to some biological interaction (e.g. predator-prey 
relationships), TACs are set for species individually. Similar TAC setting procedures are 
employed in the USA and other countries using output controls. 
 
In multi-species fisheries, the ability of the fisher to target individual species is generally 
assumed to be limited as output is characterized by joint production. The catch composition is 
a function of the type of gear employed and the relative abundance of the different species in 
the different areas or times fished.  If the relative abundance of the different species does not  3
vary substantially from area to area, then the ability of the fisher to change their catch 
composition through changing fishing area is limited. 
 
Management through TACs set on an individual species basis involves an implicit assumption 
that fishers are able to adjust their behavior sufficiently such that the catch composition 
reflects the set of TACs. If fishers are unable to adjust their catch composition, then there 
exists the likelihood of over-quota catch, leading to either illegal landings or discarding. In 
either case, the integrity of the TAC is violated, and the conservation objectives are not 
achieved. In contrast, setting TACs taking into account the likely output mix of the fishery 
may result in a more efficient use of the resource. 
 
In this paper, the potential for fishers to alter their targeting behavior is examined using a 
multi-output distance function approach. This allows the estimation of the elasticity of 
substitution between various outputs. The analysis is applied to two fleet segments operating 
in the North Sea. In each case, the stocks of one or more species caught by these fleet 
segments is in decline, and TACs for these species have been set at a low level with the 
expectation that this will result in stock recovery. If fishers are unable to change their catch 
composition to avoid these species, it is likely that these TACs will be violated and the 
potential for a rapid stock recovery reduced. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews previous studies involving the 
estimation production functions in fisheries and the treatment of multiple outputs. Then a 
description is provided of the methodology employed in the study, and the econometric 
specification of the model employed. After this, a description of the fishery examined and the 
data used in the analysis is presented. This is followed by the empirical results of the analysis,  4
including the estimates of the elasticities of output substitution. Finally, the policy 
implications of the analysis are presented.  
 
Single vs multi-output production functions in fisheries 
A production function defines the relationship between the level of inputs and the resultant 
level of outputs. It is estimated from observed outputs and input usage and indicates the 
average level of outputs for a given level of inputs (Schmidt). In fisheries, several studies 
have estimated production functions at either the individual boat level or aggregate fishery 
level (e.g. Hannesson, Bjørndal, Campbell and Lindner, Squires, Pascoe and Robinson). The 
objective of these studies was generally to estimate output elasticities associated with each 
input, and in some cases the potential for input substitution. 
 
More recently, emphasis has shifted to the estimation of production frontiers. Interest in 
technical efficiency has largely driven this shift, although there are theoretical reasons why 
the estimation of production frontiers has advantages over the estimation of production 
functions (see Kumbhakar). Only limited attempts to estimate stochastic production frontiers 
for fisheries have been undertaken
1. 
 
A common feature of these studies is the reliance on a single measure of output. This 
approach has been common for the estimation of production functions in most industries. 
However, unlike many other industries, many fisheries are characterized by joint production. 
Joint production occurs when firms produce several outputs at the same time. In fisheries, this 
is due to technological aspects of the production process, in particular technical 
interdependencies and non-allocable inputs. Resource jointness in fisheries can arise as a 
result of several reasons. In particular, many species are often found in the same geographical  5
area and will be harvested at the same time as a result of the limited selectivity of the fishing 
gear. 
 
The use of a singe composite measure of output under such circumstances imposes a number 
of restrictive assumptions.  Adding up the weight of each output assumes that all species are 
equally important in the catch, which is clearly not the case as high volume species tend to be 
low value. This can be overcome through incorporating prices into the analysis, and several 
studies have used revenue as the output measure (e.g. Sharma and Leung, Pascoe and Coglan, 
Herrero and Pascoe). The use of total revenue as the output measure requires the assumption 
that output prices do not differ between firms, and changes in ‘output’ due to changes in price 
need to be compensated for. A further method that has been applied (e.g. Pascoe, Andersen 
and de Wilde) has been to weight the quantity of each output on the basis of its revenue share. 
This avoids the biases introduced through using prices only, but assumes revenue maximizing 
behavior and competitive output markets – assumptions that may not be realistic in many 
instances. Moreover, an aggregate production function imposes the restrictive assumption of 
separability in inputs and output on the transformation function. This implies that the input 
mix can be changed significantly without affecting the slope of the production possibility 
curve, and that marginal costs depend only on the output mix, and are thus independent of the 
input prices. 
 
An alternative to single output measures is the use of multi-output measures. Several studies 
have been undertaken assessing technical efficiency and capacity utilization using Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) in fisheries (see, for example, Feltoven; Pascoe, Coglan and 
Mardle; Tingley, Pascoe and Mardle; Vestergaard, Squires and Kirkley).  A key feature of 
DEA is that it is directly able to incorporate multiple outputs into the analysis. However, as it  6
is non-parametric, it is sensitive to random error, and also does not provide estimates of the 
impact of individual inputs on the level of outputs, or the relationship between the outputs 
themselves.  
 
Alvarez and Orea examined two methods for incorporating multi outputs in fisheries 
production functions and compared these with single output measures. The first method – the 
multi-output production function – involved regressing one (of two) outputs against the other 
output and set of inputs. The second method – the output oriented distance function – 
involved a normalized and restricted model that considers the maximal proportional 
expansion of the output vector given an input vector. Both methods were found to produce 
similar output elasticities associated with each input, and these were similar to those derived 
through the single output production function. Moreover, the specification of the multi-output 
production process overcame the problems associated with the implicit assumptions imposed 
through the different aggregation processes necessary to derive the single composite output 
measure. 
 
Fousekis compared the multi-output distance function with the stochastic ray function 
approach. He found that that latter technique generally resulted in lower efficiency scores, 
although both methods produced consistent rankings of the efficiency scores. The different 
techniques also resulted in different estimates of the key production elasticities that are 
relevant for policies aiming at reduction of harvests through individual input controls. 
 
A key criticism of the multi-output production function is that the output selected as 
dependent variable plays an asymmetric role, which affects the estimated parameters of the 
production technology as well as the relevant efficiency score. In contrast, in the output  7
oriented distance function, every output plays the same role, avoiding the asymmetry problem 
(i.e., the efficiency measures are not output specific but radial). Further, the output oriented 
distance function has advantages over the other methods in that estimation is possible without 
separability and jointness, and information on prices is not required. However, estimation of 
the distance function requires the assumption of linear homogeneity in outputs, implicitly 
implying that not only efficiency, but also noise is radial. That is, the influence of noise on 
one output is the same as that upon another output. This notwithstanding, the output-oriented 
distance function appears to be the most appropriate method for estimating multi-output 
production processes. 
 
The Restricted Multi-Output Distance Function 
The methodology employed in the study largely follows that used by Fare and Grosskopf; 
Grosskopf et al.; Coelli and Perelman and Morrison Paul et al.. These studies largely derive 
from the initial distance function theory developed by Shephard (1970). Given the existence 
of a production possibility frontier, the distance that any producer is away from the frontier is 
a function of the set of inputs used, x, and the level of outputs produced, y. For the output-
oriented model, this can be expressed as 
 
(1)  )} ( ) / ( : min{ ) ( x y y x, P D ∈ = θ θ  
 
where  ) ( y x, D  is the distance from the firm’s output set to the frontier, and θ  is the 
corresponding level of efficiency. The output distance function seeks the largest proportional 
increase in the observed output vector y provided that the expanded vector  ) / ( θ y is still an 
element of the original output set (Grosskopf et al.).
2  If the firm is fully efficient, so that it is  8
on the frontier,  ) ( y x, D =θ =1, whereas  ) ( y x, D =θ <1 indicates that the firm is inefficient. 
The output distance function is homogeneous of degree one in outputs (Shephard1970).
3 
 
Fishery models recognize that capital (the vessel) is usually a fixed factor, due to limited 
second hand markets and high adjustment costs.  In this case a restricted profit function is 
appropriate, where the fishing vessel is assumed to maximize profits by choosing inputs and 
harvest level subject to the size of the vessel used in harvesting. Modeling fishermen behavior 
with profit functions, however, is appropriate only when the output quantities are choice 
variables.  For fishing vessel in individual vessel quota (IVQ) regulated fisheries
4 the harvest 
level is set by the individual quota and is no longer a choice variable, i.e., harvest is an 
exogenous or restricted factor. Hence the price-taking fishermen maximizes profits for a given 
harvest level Hit, or equivalently, minimizes the cost of harvesting the given quota, assuming 
the quota is the only fixed factor (Asche et al.). 
 
The restricted profit maximization problem can be written as: 
(2) 
) , , ( ) max(
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To anticipate the empirical estimation, the relevant variables are introduced. The vessel and 
time specific restricted profit function and the cost function are П
R
it(.) and Cit(.), respectively. 





















t, are the respective competitive market prices. Input price vectors for labour (days 
employed in fishing), x
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t, respectively. Yit is vessel (i) and time  9
(t)-specific aggregate harvest quantity. By solving for optimal levels of output, one can 
therefore find the potential rents in such a fishery.
5 
 
Given the advantages of the distance function discussed above, we model fishing behavior 
through a restricted multi-output distance function. The production technology is defined by 
output sets, P(Xit;Hit), which represents the set of all output vectors, Yit, which can be 
produced using the input vector, Xit, given that individual fishermen decide the mix of input 
quantities for a given quota (which can be vessel (i) and time (t) specific). Quotas restrict the 
harvest level Hit. That is, 
 
(4) P(Xit; Hit) = {Yit: Xit can produce Yit given Hit} 
  
For each Xit, the output set P(Xit; Hit) is assumed to satisfy the properties mentioned above. 
The output distance function is defined on the output set, P(Xit;Hit), as: 
 




















it D , the restricted output distance function, is non-decreasing in outputs and 
increasing in inputs, linearly homogeneous in outputs,  (.)
R
it D = 1 and   (.)
R
it D =1 if Yit belongs 
to the “frontier” of the production possibility set; θit measures the proportional (radial) 
expansion of the output vector that brings the ith firm to the efficient frontier.
6 
  
Shephard (1953, 1970) has shown that the output distance function may also be obtained as a 
profit maximal profit function. This means that equation (5) can alternatively be written as: 
  10
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Econometric Specification 
In order to estimate the distance from the frontier, both the frontier itself and the relationship 
between inputs and outputs need to be determined. This requires some form of multi-output 
production function P(x) to be specified. The most common functional form applied is the 
translog production function, as it does not impose restrictive assumptions regarding 
substitutability between inputs (and in this case outputs). This is particularly important in this 
study as a primary objective is to assess the elasticity of substitution between outputs. 
 
The translog distance function with M (m = 1, 2, … , M) outputs and K (k = 1, 2, … , K) 
inputs, and for I (i = 1, 2, … , I) firms, can be given by (Grosskopf et al., Coelli and 
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In order to maintain the homogeneity conditions, a number of restrictions need to be imposed. 
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The level of inefficiency can be estimated from a stochastic frontier production function of 
the form y = f(x)+v-u, where v is the error term, assumed to be N[0, σ], and u is the one sided 
inefficiency term that may take one of several distributional forms. The level of efficiency is 
estimated as the exponent of the negative of the error term, i.e., exp(-u). Consequently, 
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For estimation purposes, the negative sign on the dependent variable can be ignored (i.e., we 
use ln y1 rather than –ln y1). This results in the signs of the estimated coefficients being 
reversed, but is more consistent with the expected signs of conventional production functions 
(Coelli and Perelman), and provides a convenient means of qualitatively assessing the models. 
 
In order to separate the stochastic and inefficiency effects in the model, a distributional 
assumption has to be made for ui. Two main distributional assumptions that have been 
proposed are a normal distribution truncated at zero,  [ ] ) , ( ~
2
u j N u σ µ  (Aigner, Lovell and 
Schmidt), and a half-normal distribution truncated at zero,  [ ] ) , 0 ( ~
2
u j N u σ  (Jondrow et al.). 
In addition, the inefficiency can also be considered to have a time invariant component, so  12
that  )] ( exp[ , t T u u i t i − = η  (Battese and Coelli), where T is the terminal time period (i.e., 
i t i u u = ,  when t=T).  
 
Following Grosskopf et al., the Allen elasticities of substitution can be directly derived from 
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where Ayy’ is the Allen elasticity of substitution between output y and y’. A negative value 
indicates the outputs are substitutes, while a positive value indicates complementarity. The 
size of the value is a measure of the strength of the substitute/complementarity relationship. 
 
In order to estimate the values of the first and second order derivatives, the values of α and β 
relating to the output over which the production function was normalized need to be derived. 
This can be done by using the homogeneity restrictions that were imposed on the model. For 
the purposes of estimating the elasticity of substitution, the signs of the estimated coefficients 
need to be reversed.  
 
The UK North Sea Demersal fishery 
The North Sea contains a number of interacting multi-species fisheries of great importance to 
many countries (Figure 1).  The North Sea is the major fishing area in European Community 
waters.  Over half of the combined total allowable catches of all species in all EU waters are 
taken from the North Sea. Commercial activity in the region is mostly undertaken by 
fishermen from the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium and Norway.  13
Transboundary stocks are shared between the EU and Norway.  Based on the total allowable 
catches (TACs) and the guide prices for each species, the total value of the allowable catch in 
1999 was estimated to be about 1.5 billion Euro (Table 1). This is an underestimate of the true 
value of landings as the guide prices are generally lower than market prices. However, it 
provides an indication of the order of magnitude of the value of the fishery.   
 
This study focuses on two main fleet segments that make up the majority of the UK North Sea 
demersal fleet: the UK beam trawl and the English otter trawl fleet segments.  
 
The UK North Sea beam trawl fleet targets primarily high value flatfish (particularly sole and 
plaice), but also catches a considerable quantity of cod and anglerfish. In addition, many other 
species are caught as bycatch in varying, but small, quantities. Most of the stocks exploited by 
the fleet are heavily over-fished, resulting in a substantial decrease in quota levels over recent 
years. In addition, the fishery has been targeted for decommissioning as it is considered to 
have considerable excess capacity. Fleet size has been almost halved between 1994 and 2000 
as a result of the reduced North Sea quotas, pushing some boats into the English Channel 
and/or Celtic Sea, and decommissioning. 
 
The English otter trawlers primarily target cod, haddock, saithe and whiting, but also catch 
plaice and nethrops. These species comprise 90 per cent of the catch by volume, and a greater 
proportion by value. In addition, a range of other species is caught as bycatch.  
 
The key species caught by both groups are subject to quota controls under the European 
Common Fisheries Policy. Prior to 1998, quota was allocated to the producer organizations 
(POs) to which the trawlers belonged, based on the rolling track record of the member  14
vessels. This would increase or decrease with the actual catch of the individuals, although the 
POs were expected to attempt to keep the total catch within the allocation. Different POs ran 
different schemes, with some operating an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system (with 
trade limited to within the PO) and others operating a more competitive TAC system. For the 
fleet segments examined, most beam trawlers were managed under effectively an ITQ 
scheme, while most otter trawlers were managed under a pooled quota system. In 1999, the 
track record system was changed to a fixed quota allocation (FQA). Despite being ‘fixed’, 
these could be traded by individuals, either through an annual lease, or through more 
permanent arrangements (although the process for the latter was generally administratively 
complex, inhibiting ‘permanent’ transfers).  
 
Despite being subject to quota controls, the quotas were not binding over the period 
examined. Since the introduction of the FQAs in 1999, the only binding quotas for North Sea 
species were for saithe and sole in 2000. For most species, quota uptake ranged between 70 
and 90 per cent (DEFRA). An analysis of the available beam trawl logbook and quota 
allocation data for 2000 (see below) found that over 75 per cent of the vessels did not fill their 
quota allocation, with the remainder exceeding the allocation (presumably through quota 
leasing). Given the apparent abundance of quota and the apparent effectiveness of the quota 
leasing market, it was assumed for the purposes of this study that the quotas were not 
effectively constraining output. 
 
The Available Data  
Logbook production data and boat characteristics information from the central fleet registry 
for the beam and otter trawlers operating in the North Sea were used in the analysis. The data 
available for the otter trawl fleet relates only to the boats in the fleet registered to English  15
ports. Data on Scottish otter trawlers are held separately, and were not available for this 
analysis.
7 The logbook data were available on a monthly basis over the 11 year-period 1990-
2000.  
 
Over the period, data were available for 58 beam trawlers, although only between 30 and 40 
operated in any one year, and 152 otter trawlers, with between 100 and 120 operating in any 
one year. For both groups, only boats that were still registered in 2000 were included. As 
noted above, many boats had left the fishery as a result of decommissioning. The boats that 
left the fishery though the decommissioning scheme were most likely the least efficient, and 
their inclusion in the earlier years of the analysis (but not the later years) might have affected 
the results. Hence, for consistency, the target population was defined in terms of those boats 
that were registered in 2000.  A second condition was imposed that the boats must have 
operated in the fishery in at least three of the 11 year data period.  
 
The data set was also subject to further exclusions. For beam trawlers, boats that primarily 
targeted brown shrimp (Crangon crangon) were excluded. For these boats, the catch of the 
other species considered was negligible, and the fishing operation was considered sufficiently 
different to exclude from the analysis. Of the remaining vessels, not all boats recorded catch 
of the key species (plaice) in each year. As this formed the dependent variable in the model, 
boats that did not record landings of plaice were excluded for that year. Again, boats that did 
not have catches for at least three years after removing observations without plaice were 
excluded from the analysis. Similarly for the otter trawlers, boats that did not record landings 
of cod (the main species) were excluded. As with the beam trawl data, boats that did not have 
data for at least three years after removing observations without cod were excluded from the 
analysis. The key characteristics used in the analysis are presented in tables 2 and 3. In most  16
years, data were available for between 30 and 40 beam trawlers, and between 100 and 120 
otter trawlers.  
 
Catches of the key species used in the model varied over the period examined, largely as a 
result of changes in stock conditions. The key species were selected on the basis of both 
weight and contribution to total value and constituted 90 per cent of the value of total catch. 
The remaining species were aggregated into and ‘other’ category using a divisia index 
approach.  
 
While several physical characteristics were available in the data set, e.g. length, vessel 
capacity units and width, only engine power (kW) was used in the model. Boat deck area 
(expressed as the product of length and width) was found to be highly correlated with engine 
power (r=0.94), while vessel capacity units are a composite measure of both boat size and 
engine power (and, thus, was also highly correlated with engine power). The number of days 
at sea was also used as a variable in the model, representing the level of capital utilization. 
 
Stock information for the key species examined was available on an annual basis (ICES). 
Stock indexes were derived based on the total available biomass in each year (with the base 
year being 1990). Changes in the stock abundance over the period of the data are illustrated in 
Figure 2. As can be seen, the different species were subject to differing changes in stock 
abundance. For the ‘other’ species, average catch per day fished across the fleet was used to 
derive the stock index. This approach implicitly assumes that catch per day fished is 
proportional to the available stock abundance. Individual stock information on many of the 
species in the ‘other’ category was not available. 
  17
Accounting for variations in stock abundance in fisheries production functions is generally 
undertaken through either the direct inclusion of the stock, or through the use of dummy 
variables. A particular problem exists for the use of stock indexes in multi-output production 
functions in that each stock measure relates directly to only one of the outputs, although 
indirectly it may affect the output of the others by affecting fishing patterns.  A composite 
stock variable cannot effectively capture the stock changes of the different species, which do 
not follow a consistent pattern. Use of dummy variables is also problematic, as a single 
annual dummy variable cannot adequately represent the different individual stock effects. A 
series of individual stock dummy variables run into the same problems as the stock indexes, 
in that they cannot be related to any particular stock. In this study, a further problem was 
experienced, in that the stock indexes were highly correlated. For example, for the beam trawl 
fishery, the sole and plaice stock indexes had a correlation coefficient of 0.90, while plaice 
and ‘other’ species had a correlation coefficient of 0.80. Initial attempts at incorporating the 
stock indexes fully into the translog framework resulted in a singular matrix due to the high 
level of multicollinearity.  
 
To overcome these problems, the catches in each time period were normalized using the stock 
indexes, i.e., the catch in each time period was divided by the stock index in that time period. 
This allows the effects of changes in stock size on catch to be incorporated into the analysis, 
but imposes the implicit assumption of unitary output elasticity with respect to stock size. 
This assumption is most likely valid given the nature of the resources, in that they are widely 
dispersed, fairly uniform in density across their areas of distribution and exploited across their 




The adjusted catches of each species were normalized by plaice and cod for the beam trawl 
and the otter trawl, respectively, in order to estimate the multi-output production frontier. The 
data were further normalized by the mean value of each variable, such that the average value 
of the normalized data was equal to one. This allows the output elasticities with respect to the 
outputs of the other species and the inputs to be determined directly from the results of the 
analysis as the α coefficients.  
 
The models were estimated using FRONTER 4.1 (Coelli). A series of tests can be conducted 
to examine the specification of the models. These are tested through imposing restrictions on 
the model and using the generalized likelihood ratio statistic (λ) to determine the significance 
of the restriction. The generalized likelihood ratio statistic is given by 
[] )} ( ln{ )} ( ln{ 2 1 0 H L H L − − = λ , where ln{L(Ho)} and ln{L(H1)} are the values of the log-
likelihood function under the null (Ho) and alternative (H1) hypotheses. The restrictions form 
the basis of the null hypothesis, with the unrestricted model being the alternative hypothesis. 
The value of λ has a χ
2 distribution with the number of degrees of freedom given by the 
number of restrictions imposed. 
 
A key test is the one-sided generalized likelihood ratio-test for the existence of a frontier, i.e., 
Ho:  γ = 0.  As the alternative hypothesis is that 0 < γ < 1, the test has an asymptotic 
distribution, the critical values of which are given by Kodde and Palm. If the hypothesis is 
accepted, then there is no evidence of technical inefficiency in the data and the production 
frontier is identical to a standard production function. 
  19
Several other standard tests are carried out on the specification of the production function and 
inefficiency distribution. As the basic model is assumed to be have a translog functional form, 
the hypothesis that the correct functional form of the model is Cobb-Douglas can be imposed 
by removing the squared and cross product terms from the translog production function, i.e., 
Ho: βi,k = 0 and re-estimating the model. Distinguishing between a half normal and a truncated 
normal distribution as the most appropriate assumption for the inefficiency distribution can be 
undertaken by running the model under both assumptions. The half-normal distribution is a 
special case of the truncated normal distribution, and implicitly involves the restriction Ho: 
µ = 0. Similarly, the hypothesis that efficiency is invariant over time, i.e., Ho: η = 0 can also 
be tested. The model is estimated first assuming time variant inefficiency, then restricted by 
modeling the frontier as time invariant.  
 
The results of the specification tests indicate that the translog is the most appropriate 
functional form, that inefficiency exists, and that the most appropriate distributional 
assumption for the inefficiency is a truncated normal distribution with time varying 
inefficiency (Table 4). 
 
The results for the translog models with the appropriate distributional characteristics are 
presented in Table 5. Most of the coefficients were found to be significant at the 1 per cent 
level.  
 
The α coefficients are indicative of the elasticity of the output of the species chosen as the 
dependent variable with respect to the output of the other species and the inputs. A priori, it 
would be expected that the signs of these coefficients would be negative for the outputs of the 
other species, assuming some degree of substitution, and positive for the inputs. This was  20
found to be the case for both gear types, with the exception of haddock in the otter trawl 
model. For both gear types, the output elasticity with respect to days fished was close to unity, 
while the output elasticity with respect to engine power was less than one. This suggests 
constant returns with respect to days fished, but diminishing returns with respect to boat size. 
 
The Allen elasticities of substitution between the key species were estimated at the means of 
the various inputs and outputs (Tables 6 and 7), following the approach proposed by 
Grosskopf et al.. A negative value of the elasticity indicates a substitute, while a positive 
value indicates a complement. The results suggest that substitution of some species is 
possible, but this is largely limited to ‘bundles’ of species. For example, for the beam 
trawlers, while the main target species is plaice, it appears possible to target sole to some 
degree. However, increasing sole output also increases the catch of anglerfish and ‘other’ 
species. Similarly, the fisher could increase the catch of cod, but also ‘other’ species. For the 
otter trawlers, there appears to be two available strategies, with cod, whiting and plaice being 
one group, and haddock, saithe, nephrops and ‘other’ being an alternative bundle.  
 
In most cases, the potential of substitutability between the main species and the alternative 
species is relatively small. For example, while cod and haddock - the two main species - are 
substitutes for the otter trawlers, the elasticity of substitution is small, so the practical 
potential for substitution is limited. Similarly, the elasticity of substitution between sole and 
plaice - the two main species - for the beam trawlers is small, indicating only limited 
substitution potential.  These results have profound consequences for regulations of these 
fisheries. 
  21
The elasticity of substitution between the main target species of each fleet segment (sole and 
plaice for beam trawl, cod and haddock for otter trawl) were also estimated for each 
observation in the data set. From these estimates, the average elasticity of substitution for 
each boat over the period of the data was calculated. An apparent relationship exists between 
the elasticity of substitution between sole and plaice and boat size (expressed in terms of 
engine power) for the beam trawl fleet (Figure 3a). Larger boats tended to have a more 
negative elasticity of substitution, whereas smaller boats tended to have more of a 
complementary relationship between the species.
8 As larger boats are more mobile, they are 
more able to change fishing grounds and take advantage of different relative abundance of the 
species. In contrast, the smaller boats are more restricted in their movement, tending to fish in 
a more limited number of fishing grounds and consequently less able to adjust their output 
mix. Less of a difference was observed in the otter trawl fleet (Figure 3b). Around one quarter 
of the boats had, on average, a positive elasticity of substitution, and these tended to be the 
smaller boats in the fishery. However, a greater number of smaller vessels had negative 
elasticities, although these were also highly inelastic. 
 
The estimated distributions of efficiency for the two fleet segments differed substantially 
(Figure 4). Over two thirds of the beam trawlers were more than 70 per cent efficient on 
average over the period of the data. In contrast, over 90 per cent of the otter trawlers were less 
than 70 per cent efficient on average.  
 
From the model results (Table 5), average individual otter trawl efficiency increased by 
around 2.3 per cent a year. The removal and replacement of less efficient otter trawlers over 
the time period resulted in a slight additional increase in average efficiency for the fleet 
segment as a whole, with an average rate of efficiency increase of around 2.6 per cent (Figure  22
5). In contrast, average individual efficiency of the beam trawlers decreased by 6.5 per cent a 
year (Table 5), while removal of the lesser efficient vessels (and introduction of more efficient 
vessels into the panel) resulted in an overall average decline in the efficiency of the fleet 
segment of around 1 per cent.  
 
A decline in average individual vessel efficiency of Dutch beam trawlers operating in the 
North Sea was also observed over the same period (Pascoe et al.). This was attributed to 
increased crowding pressure, as TACs for sole and plaice were reduced while fleet sizes 
remained relatively constant. For the UK fleet, total beam trawl numbers effectively halved 
over the period examined, reducing the potential increase in crowding externalities. However, 
as overall international pressure on these shared stocks did not decrease at the same rate, this 
would still have negatively impinged on the efficiency of the UK vessels. 
 
Policy Implications 
Interactions between species in a fishery may be either biological, e.g. predator-prey, or 
technical, i.e., joint production.  Technical interactions within fisheries have generally been 
assumed to exist, although the strength of the interaction has not been previously quantified.  
Fishermen have long argued that they have an inability to target individual species, and the 
results from this study support their anecdotal evidence. Most previous studies of production 
functions and frontiers in fisheries have generally applied a composite output measure on the 
assumption that applying a set of inputs to a given set of fish stocks, usually expressed as a 
composite stock measure, results in a given level of total output. Alvarez and Orea examined 
both multi-output production functions and multi-output distance functions for two species 
(one being a composite bycatch ‘species’), but did not extend their analysis to consider 
elasticities of substitution between the outputs.  23
 
Excluding the stock from the production frontier does not allow the effects of changes in 
stock size on targeting behavior to be examined. A high relative stock abundance of a species 
would result in its cost per unit capture decreasing (relative to the other species with lower 
stock abundances), and may encourage some change in targeting behavior, i.e., output 
substitution, if possible. However, high stock abundance resulting in high catches may also 
result in lower prices, so the incentives to change targeting behavior may be less than 
expected. In either case, these effects cannot be captured (and are effectively assumed to be 
zero) through the exclusion of stock. However, as the elasticity of substitution is a technical 
(rather than economic) measure, if these factors had influenced targeting behavior and had 
resulted in changes in output composition then they should have been identified through the 
interaction terms in the model. The fact that some substitution has been observed in the data 
may be a direct result of these factors. 
 
The results of the study have implications for the continuing management of the fishery. In 
the European Union, as in most other countries, total allowable catches (TACs) are generally 
set on the basis of the status of the stock of the individual species rather than on the basis of 
the technical interactions between the species. This is particularly the case when stocks of 
some species are severely depressed, requiring substantial decreases in the allowable catch. In 
such cases, pressure is often placed on policy makers to increase the TACs of less biologically 
vulnerable species in order to reduce the impact of the reduced catch of the vulnerable species 
on fishermen’s income.  
 
In the case of the North Sea stocks, the technical interaction between haddock, cod and 
whiting, for example, has been recognized by fisheries scientists, and advice to policy makers  24
has been to control the catches of these species in relation to each other (ICES).  The decline 
in the North Sea cod stock has resulted in substantial declines in allowable catches in a bid to 
avoid stock collapse and allow the stock to recover. In 2000, the North Sea cod stock was 
estimated to be roughly 20 per cent of the level of population of mature fish required for 
sound recruitment (the Bpa, or “Biomass according to the precautionary approach”). A 
“recovery program” was instigated with the aim of enabling the stock of mature fish to 
increase by 30 per cent a year until the Bpa level has been achieved. The TAC for cod in the 
North Sea was reduced from 81,000 tonnes in 2000 to 48,600 tonnes in 2001, and further 
reduced to 41,600 tonnes in 2002 (European Commission).  
 
In contrast, North Sea TACs of both haddock and saithe were increased by 62 and 55 per cent 
respectively between 2001 and 2002. The increase in stock that is presumed to underly these 
TAC increases will result in an increased proportion of these species in the catch, ceteris 
paribus. However, stocks of these species are still considered low (ICES), and it is likely that 
the TAC increases are, in part, a means of ‘softening’ the impact of the decreased cod TACs. 
Given the limited substitutability between cod and haddock and also saithe, which is 
complementary to haddock, the disparity in the TACs may lead to increased discarding of 
over-quota cod, provided it is economically viable to continue fishing for haddock and saithe 
without the additional revenue derived from cod.
9 
 
For the beam trawl fleet, scientific advice for 2002 for the two main species was a 30 per cent 
reduction in the TAC of plaice and 20 per cent reduction in the TAC of sole in the North Sea 
(ICES 2001). Recognition was again given to the joint nature of the output of the two species 
in the scientific advice. Final changes in TACs were, in contrast, less than a 5 per cent 
decrease for plaice and 16 per cent for sole (European Commission). Again, given the limited  25
substitutability between sole and plaice, the incompatible TACs may result in increased 
discarding of sole. However, as sole is substantially more valuable on a per unit basis, it may 
not be economically viable for fishermen to land only plaice and discard sole, resulting in 
either the TAC for plaice not being filled, or providing incentives to land over-quota catch of 
sole illegally. 
 
The results of the analysis also suggest that there is an apparent relationship between boat size 
and the ability to target individual species. This was more obvious in the beam trawl fleet, 
where the larger boats demonstrated a clear substitution relationship, while the smaller vessels 
in many cases had a complementary relationship. The ability to substitute catch for the otter 
trawlers was on average also relatively low, with the smallest boats also demonstrating 
complementarity. The majority of the otter trawlers were of similar size as the smaller beam 
trawlers, reinforcing this relationship between boat size and the ability to influence product 
mix. 
 
An objection often raised in opposition of the use of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) is 
that quota tends to concentrate in the fishery in a smaller number of larger vessels. While this 
may have benefits in terms of economies of scale, the results of this study suggest that it is the 
larger vessels that are most able to adjust their product mix, and therefore be most able to 
respond to changes in the relative TACs. Restrictions on trade in quota that reduce 
concentration may be contributing to the other problem often associated with ITQs, namely 
over-quota catch and discarding. As the smaller vessels appear less able to adjust their catch 
mix, then changes in relative TACs will result in greater inconsistency between quota 
holdings and product mix unless the quota market is sufficiently flexible to allow fishers to 
adjust their quota holdings. The UK policy of fixed quota allocations inhibits the adjustment  26
of quota holdings. With limited ability to adjust both catch composition and quota holdings, 
incompatible TACs can only result in greater discarding or illegal landings. 
 
The results of the study reinforce the need for fisheries managers to consider the technical 
interactions between species when setting the TACs. These interactions have been recognized 
by fisheries scientists, and have been generally assumed to exist by fisheries economists. 
However, this represents the first empirical analysis to quantify these interactions in the 
context of fisheries management. Failure to consider these interactions may result in increased 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Kirkley, Squires and Strand 1995, 1998; Campbell and Hand; Sharma and Leung; 
Grafton, Squires and Fox; Alvarez; Pascoe, Anderson and de Wilde, Pascoe and Coglan; 
Herrero and Pascoe. 
2 Production technology is defined by output sets, P(x), which represents the set of all output 
vectors, y, which can be produced using the input vector, x, i.e., P(x)={y : x can produce y}. 
The properties of this set are summarised as follows: for each x, the output set P(x) is 
assumed to satisfy (i) 0 є P(x); (ii) non-zero output levels cannot be produced from zero level 
of inputs; (iii) P(x) satisfies strong disposability of outputs: if y є P(x) and y
* = y then y
* є 
P(x); (iv) P(x) satisfies strong disposability of inputs: if y can be produced from x, then y can 
be produced from any x
* =  x; (vi) P(x) is bounded (which is essentially a mathematical 
requirement that implies that we cannot produce unlimited levels of outputs with a given set 
of inputs); (vii) P(x) is convex (which implies that if two combinations of output levels can be 
produced with a given input vector x, then any average of these output vectors can also be 
produced; this assumption implicitly requires the commodities to be continuously divisible). 
3 The properties of D(x,y) follow directly from the axioms on the technology set and play a 
major role in efficiency measurement: (i) D(x,y) is non-decreasing in y and increasing in x; 
(ii) D(x,y) is linearly homogeneous in y; (iii) if y belongs to the production possibility set of x 
(i.e., y є P(x)), then D(x,y) = 1; and (iv) distance is equal to unity (i.e., D(x,y)=1) if y belongs 
to the “frontier” of the production possibility set. 
4 A number of fisheries are regulated with individual vessel quotas (IVQs), setting an upper 
bound on output per species per boat, in addition to a TAC for the entire fishery.  The IVQs 
may or may not be tradable. 
5 Furthermore, since the TAC is given, if some vessels are to increase their output, others 
must reduce theirs. As argued by Asche et al. , one can also obtain optimal fleet size, and  32
                                                                                                                                                          
therefore an indication of the overcapacity in the fishery. This is important information in 
fisheries managed with IVQs, as it will provide information about the extent to which one has 
been able to collect the resource rent and how much resource rent is dissipated due to 
overcapacity in the fishery. 
6 The definition of the output distance function uses min (minimum) instead of inf (infinum), 
implying the assumption of the absence of the possibility that the minimum does not exist 
(i.e., that θ = +∞  is possible). 
7 This was not a problem for the beam trawl fleet as all UK beam trawlers operate out of 
English ports. 
8 This relationship was relatively weak statistically, with a correlation of r=-0.13. This 
increased to r=-0.51 if three of the large vessels with high positive elasticities were excluded. 
9 The economic incentives to discard fish has been well established in the literature. See for 
example Anderson; , Arnason; Pascoe.  1

































































Figure 3. Individual operator’s elasticitity of substitution against engine power: a) sole and 





























































































































































Table 1: TAC allocation for North Sea species
a (kt) and estimated value
b (mEuro), 1999 
 Belgium  Denmark  France Germany Netherlands Norway UK  Total  Value
Demersal groundfish
c    
Cod 4.7  23.9  4.9 12.1 13.1 12.5 52.4  132.4  197.4
Haddock  0.8 5.2 5.8 3.3 0.4 14.9 56.0  88.6  90.9
Whiting  1.2 4.9 8.2 1.4 3.0 4.4 20.9  44.0  38.9
Saithe 0.1  2.3  13.3 6.5 0.0 57.2 4.5  110.0  84.7
Demersal flatfish    
Plaice 6.1  14.9  0.6 6.1 46.6 3.4 23.8  102.0  132.9
Sole  1.6 1.1 0.3 1.2 14.9 0.0 0.9  20.3  131.0
Invertebrates      
Nephrops  0.8 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 12.9  15.2  79.5
Other       1688.4  704.7
Total       2200.9  1460.0
a) Allocation by country based on historical shares of TAC 
b) Values based on guide prices for 1999  
c) includes ICES Division IIa for some species  6
 
Table 2. Average characteristics and catch (kg) of key species, beam trawlers 
YEAR Boats Engine 
power (kW)
Days Plaice Sole Cod Angler Other
1990 14 954 188 347,343 22,168 10,109 8,778 23,804
1991 27 791 156 194,968 15,038 6,711 6,430 20,054
1992 41 837 158 189,343 8,469 10,651 7,392 25,103
1993 43 815 178 191,841 7,247 14,440 10,688 35,899
1994 39 879 200 195,427 10,165 16,857 13,207 40,579
1995 41 842 196 187,727 9,697 13,557 12,184 38,977
1996 36 899 200 212,235 9,180 15,443 9,085 42,857
1997 38 891 191 238,279 4,163 14,526 11,150 44,008
1998 40 898 188 228,431 6,465 19,562 8,628 44,965
1999 39 898 181 190,520 7,168 13,918 6,175 37,716
2000 35 959 186 295,031 7,784 10,165 7,814 37,474
  7
 
Table 3. Average characteristics and catch (kg) of key species, otter trawlers 
YEAR Boats Engine 
power 
(kW)
Days Cod Haddock Whiting Saithe Nephrops Plaice Other
1990 88 223 147 31,171 7,094 8,340 10,539 9,017 3,635 22,358
1991 96 217 140 28,662 6,209 7,959 13,992 7,739 3,701 19,590
1992 99 211 134 29,849 9,198 8,880 5,256 6,348 4,003 18,326
1993 111 217 141 30,841 12,666 9,964 11,149 11,199 2,651 15,493
1994 102 209 117 34,012 10,481 8,898 4,641 1,231 3,423 15,056
1995 110 212 118 36,883 11,484 8,036 10,946 859 4,140 15,572
1996 110 213 119 44,432 13,322 8,679 18,314 1,285 3,377 14,778
1997 124 206 121 38,443 14,757 11264 13,019 1,493 4,411 16,330
1998 123 211 142 62,507 15,709 13,479 10,847 1,623 3,636 15,286
1999 119 216 120 30,794 13,379 11,332 15,770 2,486 3,316 14,693
2000 104 229 122 22,601 10,964 10,377 10,048 3,691 4,352 13,427
  8
Table 4. Specification tests 
 L(H0)L ( H 1) χ
2 Probability
Beam trawl 
γ = 0  -163.578 -100.621 125.915 <0.01%
a
βi,j = 0  -275.485 -100.621 349.728 0.00%
µ = 0  -102.542 -100.621 3.841 5.00%
η = 0  -108.800 -100.621 16.359 0.01%
Otter trawl 
γ = 0  -687.097 -481.432 411.331 <0.01%
 a
βi,j = 0  -810.856 -481.432 658.848 0.00%
µ = 0  -490.692 -481.432 18.521 0.00%
η = 0  -495.743 -481.432 28.622 0.00%
a) based on the one sided distribution tables developed by Kodde and Palm (1986) 
  9
Table 5. MLE results for the two fleet segments 
  Beam trawl      Otter trawl   
 Coeff SE t-stat Coeff SE t-stat 
Constant 0.731  0.081 9.054***  Constant  1.024 0.082 12.411*** 
Cod* -0.036  0.024 -1.531  Haddock*  0.121 0.012 9.752*** 
Sole* -0.233  0.016 -14.331***  Whiting*  -0.092 0.012 -7.338*** 
Angler* -0.057  0.013 -4.265***  Saithe*  -0.064 0.008 -8.016*** 
Other* -0.246  0.036 -6.750***  Nephrops*  -0.054 0.006 -9.064*** 
KW 0.654  0.069 9.470***  plaice*  -0.129 0.015 -8.561*** 
Days 1.018  0.053 19.061***  other*  -0.493 0.019 -26.379*** 
Cod*
2 -0.009  0.009 -0.988  KW  0.835 0.068 12.358*** 
Sole*
2 -0.012  0.003 -3.758***  Days  0.978 0.029 33.691*** 
Angler*
2 -0.012  0.003 -4.560***  Haddock*
2 0.009 0.003 3.529*** 
Other*
2 -0.034  0.008 -4.433***  Whiting*
2 -0.006 0.002 -3.582*** 
KW
2 -0.036  0.094 -0.383  Saithe*
2 0.002 0.001 1.604 
Days
2 0.032  0.048 0.676  Nephrops*
2 -0.001 0.001 -1.047 
Cod*sole*   0.008  0.012 0.639  Plaice*
2 -0.010 0.003 -4.000*** 
Cod*angler* 0.008  0.009 0.823  Other*
2 -0.016 0.005 -3.220*** 
Cod*other* -0.013  0.016 -0.809*** KW
2 0.008 0.105 0.077 
Sole*angler* -0.006 0.006 -1.057***  Days
2 -0.011 0.026 -0.415 
Sole*other* -0.041  0.013 -3.220  Had*wht*  -0.015 0.004 -4.107*** 
Angler*other* 0.027 0.010 2.783  Had*saithe*  0.015 0.004 4.086*** 
Kw days  -0.041  0.058 -0.704  Had*nep*  0.003 0.002 1.821* 
Kw cod*  0.000  0.036 0.008  Had*plaice*  -0.015 0.005 -3.086*** 
Kw sole*  0.168  0.024 6.904***  Had*other*  0.023 0.006 3.468*** 
Kw ang*  0.018  0.014 1.270  whit*saithe*  0.000 0.003 0.065 
Kw other*  -0.241  0.045 -5.389***  Whi*neph*  0.003 0.002 1.219 
Days cod*  0.040  0.036 1.108  Whi*plaice*  0.002 0.003 0.868 
Days sole*  -0.057  0.021 -2.682***  Whi*other*  0.017 0.004 3.945*** 
Days ang*  -0.043  0.016 -2.679***  Saithe*nep*  0.000 0.001 0.446 
Days other*  0.075  0.037 2.047**  saithe*plaice*  0.007 0.004 1.756* 
σ
2  2.650 0.830 3.192***  Saithe*other*  -0.039 0.005 -7.811*** 
γ  0.974 0.008 115.683***  Nep*plaice*  0.007 0.003 2.111** 
µ  -3.214 0.616 -5.221***  Nep*other*  -0.021 0.004 -4.845*** 
η  -0.065 0.014 -4.726***  plaice*other*  0.023 0.005 4.133*** 
       Kw  days -0.045 0.067 -0.671 
     Kw  had*  -0.095 0.024 -4.029*** 
     Kw  whi*  0.050 0.020 2.542** 
       Kw  saithe*  0.005 0.013 0.340 
       Kw  neph* 0.037 0.013 2.775*** 
       Kw  plaice*  0.023 0.026 0.862 
       Kw  other*  0.077 0.028 2.753*** 
       Days  had*  0.046 0.011 4.321*** 
       Days  whi*  -0.015 0.013 -1.154 
       Days  saithe*  0.022 0.008 2.789*** 
       Days  neph*  -0.021 0.006 -3.251*** 
       Days  plaice*  -0.020 0.017 -1.174 
       Days  other*  -0.037 0.018 -2.050** 
         σ
2  0.240 0.025 9.539*** 
         γ  0.617 0.030 20.634*** 
         µ  0.770 0.067 11.427*** 
         η  0.023 0.004 5.604*** 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.  10
 
Table 6. Elasticity of substitution: beam trawl 
 Plaice  Sole Cod Angler Other
Plaice - 
Sole -0.373  -
Cod -0.291  -0.659 -
Angler 0.465  0.346 -2.653 -
Other -1.808  0.513 1.026 -1.391 -
 
Table 7. Elasticity of substitution: otter trawl 
 Cod Haddock Whiting Saithe Nephrops Plaice Other
Cod -
Haddock -0.247 -
Whiting 0.029 -0.570 -
Saithe -0.347 0.820 -0.016 -
Nephrops -0.247 0.214 -0.237 -0.053 -
Plaice 0.281 -0.411 -0.083 -0.370 -0.448 -
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